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Abstract 
 
The internal models amendment to the Basel Accord allows banks to use internal models to 
forecast Value-at-Risk (VaR) thresholds, which are used to calculate the required capital 
that banks must hold in reserve as a protection against negative changes in the value of 
their trading portfolios. As capital reserves lead to an opportunity cost to banks, it is likely 
that banks could be tempted to use models that underpredict risk, and hence lead to low 
capital charges. In order to avoid this problem the Basel Accord introduced a backtesting 
procedure, whereby banks using models that led to excessive violations are penalised 
through higher capital charges. This paper investigates the performance of five popular 
volatility models that can be used to forecast VaR thresholds under a variety of 
distributional assumptions. The results suggest that, within the current constraints and the 
penalty structure of the Basel Accord, the lowest capital charges arise when using models 
that lead to excessive violations, thereby suggesting the current penalty structure is not 
severe enough to control risk management. In addition, this paper suggests an alternative 
penalty structure that is more effective at aligning the interests of banks and regulators. 
 
Keywords: Value-at-Risk (VaR), GARCH, risk management, violations, forecasting, 
simulations, Basel Accord penalties. 
 
JEL Classifications: G32, G11, G17, C53, C22.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The 2008/09 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) has highlighted the catastrophic 
consequences of unexpected and widespread trading losses, coupled with grossly 
inadequate risk management practices. In addition, the perceived willingness of central 
banks worldwide to bail out distressed financial institutions demonstrates that there exists 
a substantial moral hazard problem facing the global banking and financial sector. 
 
The internal models amendment to the Basel Accord allows banks to use internal models 
to forecast Value-at-Risk (VaR) thresholds, which are used subsequently to calculate the 
required capital (capital charges) that banks must hold in reserve as a protection against 
negative changes in the value of their trading portfolios. As capital reserves lead to an 
opportunity cost to Authorised Deposit-taking Institutions (ADIs), it is likely that ADIs 
could be tempted to use models that underpredict risk, and hence lead to low capital 
charges. This would be especially likely in circumstances where implicit or explicit 
government guarantees were provided. In order to avoid this problem, the Basel Accord 
introduced a backtesting procedure, whereby banks using models that led to excessive 
violations are penalised through higher capital charges (see Section 3 for further details 
regarding the Basel Accord). 
 
McAleer and da Veiga (2008a, 2008b), have argued that, within the constraints of the 
Basel Accord, ADIs should choose the model that leads to the lowest possible capital 
charge, conditional on the model not leading to the ADI having an excessive number of 
violations. Such an approach will ensure that the opportunity cost associated with capital 
charges are minimized, while maximizing the benefits associated with minimal 
regulatory intervention. Furthermore, ADIs that have good risk management systems in 
place will benefit from superior reputation, lower cost of debt, and perhaps stronger 
demand for its deposit facilities.  
 
McAleer and da Veiga (2008a, 2008b) found that models that led to an excessive number 
of violations also tend to yield lower capital charges, compared with models that led to 
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the correct number of violations (see also da Veiga et al. (2008), Jiménez-Martín et al. 
(2009) and McAleer et al. (2009a, 2009b)). These findings would seem to suggest that 
the Basel II Accord penalty structure is likely to encourage ADIs to choose models that 
understate their true market risk exposure, as capital charges represent a cost to ADIs. 
This finding suggests that the penalty structure associated with the Basel Accord 
backtesting procedure is not severe enough. Lucas (2001) first presented this finding and 
showed that, under the current penalty structure, ADIs are likely to underreport risk by 
25%. This finding is consistent with Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) where it was found 
that commercial banks tend to underestimate risk and lead to excessive, and serially 
correlated, violations. 
 
The recent empirical studies by Berkowitz et al. (2006) and Perignon et al. (2008) have 
found that large international banks have a tendency to use models that overstate risk and 
lead to a lower number of violations than might be expected. Thus, there is a need for a 
regulatory framework that prevents inappropriate risk taking and leads banks to choose 
the correct models endogenously remains of paramount importance to the stability of the 
global financial system. Furthermore, all empirical evidence to date regarding VaR 
thresholds reported by ADIs has been based on an extremely small sample of primarily 
North American publicly-listed ADIs. There are many reasons why these particular 
institutions may not wish to underreport risk, including investor backlash and increased 
regulatory scrutiny. However, in poorly regulated jurisdictions, with less transparent 
reporting systems and relatively unsophisticated investors, it is possible that ADIs may 
attempt to knowingly underreport risk in order to minimise capital charges. Therefore, the 
regulatory framework should be structured in such a way so that ADIs would not have an 
incentive to choose models that have a tendency to underreport risk.  
 
The aim of the paper is to investigate this issue further and to develop backtesting 
procedures that will better align the interests of both regulators and ADIs. Section 2 
formulates the optimization problem faced by ADIs. Section 3 summarises the market 
risk amendment to the Basel Accord, and discusses the current penalty structure for 
violations. Section 4 presents an empirical analysis that compares the capital charges 
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produced by various models and shows that, under the current penalty structure, ADIs 
have an incentive to underpredict risk. A simulation exercise is presented in Section 5, 
and some concluding remarks are given in Section 6. 
 
2. The problem faced by ADIs 
 
The maximization problem faced by ADIs with regards to their VaR forecasts can be 
formulated as follows. Let 
Equation Section 7 
 , , ,t i t i t i tVaR r z     (1) 
 
where ,i tr

 is the forecasted return from model i at time t, ,i tz

is the forecasted critical 
value from model i at time t, and ,i t  is the forecasted standard deviation from model i at 
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Therefore, the Basel Accord capital charges are given by: 
 
 *1 1(1 )t t t t tCC VaR CC     (8) 
 
Therefore, ADIs must solve the following problem: 
 
 
*
1 1   (1 )t t t t tMin CC VaR CC     (9) 
Over the choice of model and distributional assumption. Subject to: 
 
 250tVio   (10) 
 
where   is the upper bound allowed by regulators. Other constraints could be included 
to take into account other concerns of regulators and ADIs. 
 
3. Background 
 
On June 26, 1974 Herstatt, a German bank, had received large payments of DEM in 
Frankfurt in exchange for USD payments that were to be made in New York later that 
day due to time zone differences. However, before the USD payments were made, 
Herstatt was forced into liquidation by German regulators. The Herstatt fiasco led the G-
7 
 
10 countries to form a committee called the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
which was initially intended to deal with the role of regulators in cross-jurisdictional 
situations and to investigate ways of harmonizing international banking regulations. 
 
In 1988 the Basel Committee issued the Basel Capital Accord, which prescribes 
minimum capital requirements that Authorized Deposit Taking Institutions (ADIs) must 
meet as a protection against credit risk. This became law in all G-10 countries by 1992, 
with the exception of Japan, where an extended transition period was granted. 
 
In 1993 the Basel Accord was amended to require ADIs also to hold capital in reserve 
against market risk, based on the Value-at-Risk (VaR) approach. The VaR procedure is 
designed to forecast the maximum expected loss over a target horizon, given a statistical 
confidence limit (see Jorion (2000) for a detailed discussion of VaR methods). Initially, 
the Basel Accord stipulated a standardized approach which all institutions were required 
to adopt in calculating their VaR thresholds. This approach suffered from several 
deficiencies, the most notable of which were its assumption of no diversification benefits, 
which led to conservatism (and hence greater opportunity costs), and its failure to reward 
institutions with superior risk management expertise. In view of these drawbacks a 
further amendment, called the Market Risk amendment, was proposed in 1995 and 
subsequently adopted in 1996.  
 
The Market Risk amendment to the Basel Accord allows ADIs to use internal models to 
measure and forecast market risk. The forecasted market risk, or volatility, forms a basis 
for the calculation of VaR which, in turn, is used to determine the required capital 
charges. 
 
In order to maintain discipline and ensure that ADIs have in place adequate models of 
market risk, a backtesting procedure is used to count the number of times the actual 
losses exceeded the forecasted VaR over the previous 250 business days. As VaR models 
are designed to provide 99% coverage (or lead to violations 1% of the time), the Basel 
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Accord specifies penalties that increase the required capital charge if too many violations 
are detected. 
 
A three-zone approach is used to measure the accuracy of the forecasting model, as 
shown in Table 1. ADIs that fall in the Green zone are deemed to have models that are 
adequately accurate, and do not incur penalties from regulators. Once in the Yellow zone, 
regulators will impose a penalty which will increase the required capital charge and will 
be required to justify the excessive number of violations: the greater is the number of 
violations, the more likely it is that ADIs will be penalized and required to revise their 
model. Finally, if an ADI enters the Red zone, the model used is deemed to be 
unacceptably inaccurate, and the ADI will be required to adopt a more stringent model 
that will lead to fewer violations and larger capital charges. 
 
Under the internal models amendment to the Basel Accord, the capital charge must be set 
at the higher of the previous day’s VaR or the average VaR over the last 60 days, 
multiplied by a factor (3+k). Finally, if a bank’s model is found to be inadequate as it 
leads to an excessive number of violations, the bank may be required to adopt the 
standardized approach, which can lead to higher capital charges. Hence, it is vitally 
important that the model used does not lead to backtesting results that fall in the yellow 
zone and (especially) red zone, lest regulators find the model to be inadequate and require 
the bank to adopt the standardized approach. 
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Table 1: Basel Accord Penalty Zones 
 
Zone Number of Violations Increase in k 
Green 0 to 4 0.00 
Yellow 5 0.40 
 6 0.50 
 7 0.65 
 8 0.75 
 9 0.85 
Red 10+ 1.00 
 
Note: The number of violations is given for 250 
business days. The capital charge is given as the 
average VaR over the last 60 trading days, multiplied 
by a factor (3+k). 
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4. Empirical Analysis 
 
In this section the VaR thresholds for the S&P500 index are forecasted for the period 14 
January 1986 to 28 March 2005. In order to remain consistent with the Basel Accord, a 
10-day holding period return is used. The data are plotted in Figure 1. The returns display 
significant clustering, which needs to be analysed using an appropriate conditional 
volatility model.  
 
Figure 2 gives the histogram and descriptive statistics for the S&P500 returns. The series 
has mean and median close to zero, and a standard deviation of 3.2%. The returns range 
from 14.3% to -37.7%, which correspond to the 1987 crash. Furthermore, the returns 
series are negatively skewed, display excess kurtosis, and are highly non-normal 
according to the Jarque-Bera test statistic. 
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Figure 2: Histogram and Descriptive Statistics for S&P500 10-day Returns 
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VaR thresholds are forecasted using the RiskmetricsTM, ARCH, GARCH, GJR and 
EGARCH models, for a rolling window of 2000 observations, which yield 3010 
forecasts, as there are 5010 observations in the sample period. Furthermore, the VaR 
thresholds are calculated under three distributional assumptions, namely normal, student t 
and generalized error distribution (GED).  
 
The critical values are also obtained through bootstrapping. Figures 3 to 6 plot the 
estimated critical values used in this section. The t distribution generally gives the widest 
confidence intervals, while the normal distribution gives the narrowest. In order to remain 
consistent with the Basel Accord, a 99% level of confidence is used.  
 
Table 1 presents the results of the forecasting exercise, and are ranked according to the 
number of violations. A general trend is that the VaR thresholds obtained under the 
assumption of normality generally lead to the highest number of violations, the greatest 
time spent out of the Green zone, and lowest Basel Accord capital charges. Using a t 
distribution leads to the lowest number of violations, the least amount of time spent out of 
the Green zone, and the highest Basel Accord capital charges.  
 
The results obtained using the GED and bootstrapped critical values are very similar, 
lying between those obtained for the t and normal distributions. It is interesting to note 
that using a t distribution often leads to results that fail the UC test due to insufficient 
violations, thereby suggesting that the VaR thresholds obtained are excessively 
conservative. 
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Figure 3: Normal Distribution 99% Critical Values 
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Figure 4: GED 99% Critical Values 
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Figure 5: t Distribution 99% Critical Values 
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Figure 6: Bootstrap 99% Critical Values 
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Table 1: VaR Threshold Forecast Results 
 
  Capital Charges  Statistical Tests 
New Penalty 
Model No. of Violations 
Basel 
Accord 1  2  3 
Proportion  
out of  
Green 
UC Ind CC 
ARCH N 80 8.099 10.484 14.203 17.92 67% 24.93* 0.032 24.96*
RiskmetricsTM N 59 7.882 9.482 11.809 14.136 57% 9.501* 3.719 13.22*
GARCH N 47 7.928 9.200 11.096 12.993 42% 3.554 2.257 5.811 
GJR N 45 7.656 8.635 10.128 11.622 33% 2.809 2.481 5.29 
ARCH GED 43 8.542 9.931 12.027 14.123 41% 2.137 0.167 2.304 
ARCH BS 42 8.448 9.821 11.882 13.943 41% 1.834 0.21 2.044 
EGARCH N 42 7.536 8.516 9.977 11.483 35% 1.834 0.258 2.092 
RiskmetricsTM 
GED 35 8.271 8.768 9.459 10.151 19% 0.331 1.09 1.421 
RiskmetricsTM BS 31 8.483 8.737 9.099 9.460 12% 0.011 1.84 1.851 
GJR GED 30 8.307 8.974 9.927 10.88 21% 0.000 1.619 1.619 
EGARCH GED 28 8.123 8.591 9.241 9.892 15% 0.066 0.269 4.152 
GJR BS 27 8.509 8.989 9.656 10.322 15% 0.145 2.371 2.516 
EGARCH BS 25 8.301 8.18 8.815 9.111 8% 0.404 0.212 0.335 
GARCH GED 22 8.308 8.536 8.853 9.170 9% 1.055 4.488 5.543 
GARCH BS 21 8.591 8.778 9.033 9.289 6% 1.35 0.147 1.497 
EGARCH t  15 9.710 9.710 9.710 9.710 0% 4.079 0.073 0.616 
RiskmetricsTM  t  14 10.095 10.095 10.095 10.095 0% 4.718 0.061 4.779 
GARCH t  13 10.353 10.353 10.353 10.353 0% 5.415 0.053 5.468 
GJR t  13 10.095 10.095 10.095 10.095 0% 5.415 0.053 5.468 
ARCH t  11 11.542 11.555 11.572 11.589 0.3% 7.031* 0.044 7.075*
Notes: The Unconditional Coverage (UC) test is asymptotically distributed as 2 (1) , and 
the Serial Independence (Ind) and Conditional Coverage tests are asymptotically distributed as 
2 (2) Entries in bold denote significance at 5% and * denotes significance at 1%. As there are 
3010 days in the forecasting period, the expected number of violations at the 1% level is 30. 
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The results reported in Table 1 clearly show that the current penalty structure proposed 
by the Basel Accord rewards ADIs that use models that under report risk and lead to an 
excessive number of violations. Therefore, the current penalty structure does not align the 
interests of regulators with those of ADIs. In order to relieve this problem, we suggest 
that the penalty structure should be much more severe. In this paper we modify the Basel 
Accord capital charges to be given by:  
 
 *1 1(1 )t t t t tCC VaR CC     (10) 
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where   is a scaling factor chosen by regulators. In this paper,   has been set equal to 
one, two and three.  
 
The capital charges given by the new penalty structures are presented in Table 1. Under 
the Basel Accord penalty structure, the minimum capital charge, at 7.54%, is given by the 
EGARCH model when it is estimated under the assumption of normality. This case leads 
to backtesting results that lie outside the Green zone 35% of the time. The new penalty 
structure, which is substantially more severe than the Basel Accord penalty, performs 
better in terms of aligning the interests of ADIs and regulators. Using the new penalty 
structure, the minimum capital charges are given by the EGARCH model using 
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bootstrapped critical values, which lead to backtesting results that lie outside the Green 
zone only 8% of the time.  
 
More importantly, under the existing penalty structure, models that lead to excessive 
violations, such as the RiskmetricsTM and ARCH models under the assumption of 
normality, lead to some of the lowest capital charges, while leading to backtesting results 
that fall out of the green zone 57% and 67% of the time, respectively. The new penalty 
structures reverse this trend, and lead to substantially higher capital charges for models 
that yield excessive violations than models that have the correct coverage.  
 
Figure 7 plots the relationship between the number of violations and capital charges 
given by each model under the current Basel Accord penalty structure. As previously 
stated, the minimum point corresponds to the EGARCH model estimated under the 
assumption of normality, which leads to an average capital charge of 7.54%. Figure 7 
also fits a second-order polynomial to the data, with the values given in parenthesis being 
the t ratios corresponding to the parameter estimates. The capital charges are minimised 
under the current penalty structure when violations occur approximately 1.86% of the 
time, at nearly twice the correct number of violations. 
 
The relationship between the number of violations and capital charges given by each 
model under the new penalty structures are given in Figure 8 for 1  , Figure 9 for 
2   and Figure 10 for 3  . The minimum capital charges, according to the 
estimated equations, occur when violations occur approximately 1.36% of the time for 
1  , approximately 0.80% of the time for 2  , and approximately 0.30% of the time 
for 3  . Based on the above analysis, it would appear that the penalty structure using 
2   is superior to the others as it would lead ADIs to choose models that lead to 
violations approximately 0.8% of the time, which is closest to the target level of 
violations at the 1% level of significance. 
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Figure 7: Relationship Between Number of Violations and Capital Charges for the Basel 
Accord Penalty Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Relationship Between Number of Violations and Capital Charges for the New 
Penalty Structure ( 1  ) 
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Figure 9: Relationship Between Number of Violations and Capital Charges for the New 
Penalty Structure ( 2  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Relationship Between Number of Violations and Capital Charges for the New 
Penalty Structure ( 3  ) 
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3. Simulation Exercise 
 
A careful analysis of the results presented in Table 1 shows that differences between 
different types of models, under the same distributional assumption, is much smaller than 
the differences between the same model under different distributional assumptions. This 
result suggests that the within the class of conditional volatility models, the most 
important consideration for ADIs is the distribution for purposes of calculating the 
critical values. In this section, we use simulated data to analyse the importance of 
choosing the correct critical value. The returns are simulated using a GARCH model and 
a t distribution with 10 degrees of freedom. A total of 20,000 returns are simulated. 
Figure 11 plots the simulated returns. 
 
In order to analyse the Current Basel Accord penalty structure, the industry standard 
RiskmetricsTM model is used to forecast the conditional variance for the simulated returns 
series. As the RiskmetricsTM model is calibrated using a simple formula, and thereby does 
not require estimation, ADIs must choose what critical value to use. In this paper we 
analyse the importance of choosing the correct critical value by estimating VaR 
threshold, and then calculating average capital charges for a range of critical values. The 
critical values that are chosen range from 1 to 7, with increments of 0.01. As the correct 
critical value for returns that follow a t distribution with 10 degrees of freedom is 2.764, 
it is expected that critical values lower (higher) than 2.764 will lead to a greater (lower) 
number of violations than expected at the 1% critical value. 
  
Figure 12 gives the relationship between the number of violations and the Basel Accord 
capital charges. Each point on this graph corresponds to the results obtained for one 
critical value. These results suggest that the Basel Accord capital charges are a decreasing 
function of the number of violations. In short, banks are likely to have an incentive to 
choose models that will lead to the maximum number of violations permitted by 
regulators. 
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Figure 11: Simulated Returns Assuming a t distribution with 10 Degrees of Freedom 
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Figure 12: Relationship Between Number of Violations and Capital Charges for the Basel 
Accord Penalty Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Relationship Between Number of Violations and Capital Charges for the New 
Penalty Structure ( 1  ) 
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Figure 14: Relationship Between Number of Violations and Capital Charges for the New 
Penalty Structure ( 2  ) 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Relationship Between Number of Violations and Capital Charges for the New 
Penalty Structure ( 3  ) 
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Figures 13 to 15 give the relationship between the number of violations and the capital 
charges obtained under the new penalty structure, which produces a minimum of between 
0 and 4% of violations. If it is assumed that regulators will place an upper bound on the 
maximum number of violations allowed before a model is deemed to be inadequate, then 
the new penalty structure is superior to the existing one as it would lead ADIs to choose 
models that provide more conservative VaR forecasts. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper the ability of the current penalty structure proposed in the Basel Accord to 
align the interests of regulators with those of ADIs was investigated. In accordance with 
the findings of Lucas (2001), the current Basel Accord penalty structure was found to be 
highly inadequate. In particular, the results suggest that the Basel Accord penalty 
structure provided an incentive for ADIs to underreport risk, thereby lowering the 
required capital charges.  
 
In order to demonstrate that more severe penalties for violations are needed, this paper 
presented a simple new penalty structure. The results showed that the new penalty 
structure was substantially more effective in aligning the interests of ADIs with those of 
regulators by awarding ADIs incentives to choose more conservative VaR models. 
Through a simulation exercise, it was shown that the new penalty structure creates a 
relationship between capital charges and the number of violations where a minimum is 
achieved. This suggests that if regulators place an upper bound on the permitted number 
of violations before an ADI is required to change their model, the new penalty structure is 
superior in aligning the interests of both ADIs and regulators. 
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